## State Bar Court of California **Hearing Department** Los Angeles **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only 12-O-12384-RAP **Anand Kumar** PUBLIC MATTER **Deputy Trial Counsel** 1149 S. Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90015 (213) 765-1714 MAR 2 8 2013 Bar # 261592 Counsel For Respondent STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO Arthur Lewis Margolis 2000 Riverside Drive Los Angeles, CA 90039 (323) 953-8996 Submitted to: Settlement Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND Bar # 57703 **DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING** In the Matter of: Donald Arthur Hilland **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** ☐ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED Bar # 240436 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

# A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 19, 2005.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included vunder "Facts."

Effective January 1, 2011)

kwiktag\* 152 143 360

Actual Suspension

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(5)		Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".					
(6)	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."						
(7)	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.						
(8)	Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):						
		Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless					
		relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.  Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.					
		Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".  Costs are entirely waived.					
	Profe	avating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for essional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances equired.					
(1)		Prior record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]					
	(a)	☐ State Bar Court case # of prior case					
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective					
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:					
	(d)	☐ Degree of prior discipline					
	(e)	If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.					
(2)		<b>Dishonesty:</b> Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.					
(3)		<b>Trust Violation:</b> Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to accour to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.					
(4)		Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.					
(5)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct					

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(6)		Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.		
(7)	$\boxtimes$	<b>Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:</b> Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoir or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See stipulation, at page 8.		
(8)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.		
Add	ition	al aggravating circumstances:		
		ating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating imstances are required.		
(1)		<b>No Prior Discipline:</b> Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.		
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.		
(3)		<b>Candor/Cooperation:</b> Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.		
(4)		<b>Remorse:</b> Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.		
(5)		<b>Restitution:</b> Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.		
(6)		<b>Delay:</b> These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.		
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.		
(8)		<b>Emotional/Physical Difficulties:</b> At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product or any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.		
(9)		<b>Severe Financial Stress:</b> At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stres which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.		
(10)		<b>Family Problems:</b> At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.		
(11)		<b>Good Character:</b> Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.		
(12)		<b>Rehabilitation:</b> Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.		

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(13)		Noı	mitiga	ting circumstances are involved.			
Addi	ition	al mit	tigatin	g circumstances:			
	. <b>S</b>	ee sti	ipulati	ion, at page 9.			
D. C	)isc	iplin	e:				
(1)	$\boxtimes$	⊠ Stayed Suspension:					
	(a)	$\boxtimes$	Resp	pondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.			
	•	i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.			
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.			
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:			
	(b)	$\boxtimes$	The	above-referenced suspension is stayed.			
(2)	Probation:			:			
	Res date	spond e of th	ent mo	ust be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, which will commence upon the effective preme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)			
(3)	$\boxtimes$	Actual Suspension:					
	(a)	$\boxtimes$		condent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period ty (60) days.			
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct			
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.			
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:			
E. A	ddit	tiona	ıl Co	nditions of Probation:			
(1)		If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.					
(2)		During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.					
(3)		With State	in ten e Bar a	(10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of			

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	·		mation, including current office addres oses, as prescribed by section 6002.1		hone number, or other address for State Bar ness and Professions Code.	
(4)		and schedule a meeting with Respondent conditions of probation. Upon the direction		late of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation 's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and n of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the lephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must be directed and upon request.		
(5) Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conductions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state ware any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case nu current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.				ne Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, oder penalty of perjury, Respondent must state Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all quarter. Respondent must also state whether there is State Bar Court and if so, the case number and all cover less than 30 days, that report must be		
	•				ining the same information, is due no earlier than robation and no later than the last day of probation.	
(6)		Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.				
(7)		Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.				
(8)	$\boxtimes$	Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.				
			No Ethics School recommended. Re	eason:	•	
(9)		Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.				
(10)		The f	ollowing conditions are attached here	to and inco	rporated:	
			Substance Abuse Conditions		Law Office Management Conditions	
			Medical Conditions		Financial Conditions	
F. O	the	r Con	ditions Negotiated by the Pa	rties:		
(1)	⊠	Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.				

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		☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason:
(2)		Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(3)		Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(4)		<b>Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:</b> Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
(5)		Other Conditions:

Attachment language (if any):

### **ATTACHMENT TO**

### STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

**Donald Arthur Hilland** 

CASE NUMBER:

12-O-12384-RAP

### FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 12-O-12384-RAP (Complainant: Shawn Montano)

#### **FACTS:**

- 1. On September 21, 2009, before the effective date of Civil Code, section 2944.7(a), Respondent agreed to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Shawn Montano ("Montano") on real property Montano owned in California. Respondent agreed to negotiate the loan modification agreement for Montano on a pro bono basis.
- 2. Despite Respondent's efforts, he was unable to negotiate a loan modification between September 21, 2009 and October 21, 2009 with the mortgage lender for Montano's property.
- 3. As a result, on October 22, 2009, Montano entered into a written fee agreement for Respondent to represent him in the residential mortgage loan modification on his property.
- 4. On the same day, October 22, 2009, Montano paid Respondent \$1,000.00 check as an advanced fee for the loan modification services. Montano also paid Respondent with a second check for \$1,600.00 on December 28, 2009, which Respondent cashed on January 12, 2010. At the time Respondent collected the advanced fees, he had not completed all of the loan modification services Montano hired him to perform.
- 5. Prior to entering into the fee agreement for the loan modification services, Respondent did not provide Montano with the following written statement: "It is not necessary to pay a third party to arrange for a loan modification or other form of forbearance from your mortgage lender or servicer. You may call your lender directly to ask for a change in your loan terms. Nonprofit housing counseling agencies also offer these and other forms of borrower assistance free of charge. A list of nonprofit housing counseling agencies approved by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is available from your local HUD office or by visiting www.hud.gov."
- 6. On March 19, 2012, a State Bar investigation was opened regarding a complaint filed by Montano.

- 7. On May 15, 2012, in the course of the investigation, a State Bar investigator sent Respondent a letter requesting information from Respondent regarding his performance on behalf of Montano, including a copy of the fee agreement that Respondent entered into with Montano. Respondent received the letter.
- 8. On June 24, 2012, Respondent sent the State Bar investigator a copy of the fee agreement he entered into with Montano for the loan modification services. Respondent altered or caused to be altered the dates of his and Montano's signatures in the fee agreement to reflect that Respondent and Montano entered into the fee agreement on October 2, 2009, which was prior to the October 11, 2009 effective date of Civil Code, section 2944.7(a).
- 9. Respondent altered or caused to be altered the date of the fee agreement and sent the altered fee agreement to the State Bar in the course of its investigation concerning potential misconduct he engaged in an attempt to mislead the State Bar.
- 10. On January 28, 2013, Respondent refunded the \$2,600.00 illegal fees to Montano.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 11. By negotiating, arranging or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving at least \$2,600.00 from Montano prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform, in violation of subsection (a)(1) of section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
- 12. By negotiating, arranging and offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by Montano in advance of any service and thereafter entering into a fee agreement with Montano without providing him, prior to entering into the agreement, the separate statement, in not less than 14-point bold type, specifically proscribed in section 2944.6(a) of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
- 13. By altering or causing to be altered the date of the fee agreement and attempting to mislead the State Bar concerning his loan modification services performed on behalf of Montano, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

### ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing: Respondent's misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing under Standard 1.2(b)(ii). While Respondent's misconduct occurred in the scope of a single client matter, he committed two violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3 relating to the loan modification services. Additionally, Respondent altered or caused be altered the date of fee agreement concerning the loan modification services in the course of the State Bar's investigation.

### ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Cooperation with State Bar: Notwithstanding Respondent's attempt to thwart the State Bar's investigation, he has subsequently cooperated with the State Bar by entering into a stipulated settlement for the matter described herein to simplify the proceedings without the need of a trial to resolve this matter. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [mitigative credit given where attorney admitted facts and culpability in order to simplify the disciplinary proceedings].)

### AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (*In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

Respondent admits to committing three acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.

The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent's misconduct is found in standard 2.3, which applies to his attempt to mislead the State Bar, an act of moral turpitude in violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106. (See Borré v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1047, 1053; Chang v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114, 128; In the Matter of Conner (Review Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93, 103.) Standard 2.3 provides that culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law.

Here, there are two victims of Respondent's misconduct—Montano, by virtue of the collection of and failure to promptly refund the illegal fee, and the State Bar, vis-à-vis Respondent's attempt to mislead the State Bar in its investigation. The magnitude of Respondent's misconduct is serious as it

involves an attempt to exculpate himself of culpability by altering or causing to be altered a fee agreement in the course of the State Bar investigation. However, the misconduct arose from a single client matter and as such the degree to which his misconduct reflects on his overall practice of law is accordingly lessened.

The State Bar is unaware of any similar cases concerning an attempt to mislead the State Bar stemming from a single client matter whereby the attempt to mislead the State Bar was the most serious misconduct involved. Accordingly, *Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085 is helpful to understand how the court views cases involving dishonesty occurring in the practice of law.

In *Drociak*, an attorney was found culpable of violating Business and Professions Code, section 6106 when he used his client's pre-signed verification to respond to discovery requests without first consulting with his client Jayne House, who Drociak failed to realize was deceased at the time. As a result, Drociak answered the interrogatories himself and served them on the opposing party without ensuring the veracity of the factual assertions in the discovery responses. Despite the fact that Drociak had no prior record of discipline over 25 years of practice, the Supreme Court determined that a 30-day actual suspension was "necessary and appropriate to protect the public and to deter future misconduct." (*Id.* at p. 1091.)

Like *Drociak*, Respondent's misconduct is serious. In certain instances, a misrepresentation to the State Bar can be more serious than the underlying misconduct itself. (See *In the Matter of Dahlz* (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 269, 282 ["deception of the State Bar may constitute an even more serious offense than the conduct being investigated."].) Here, Respondent's misconduct stemmed from a single violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3, but his misrepresentation has made the instant misconduct much more serious. Accordingly, the instant level of discipline applicable to Respondent's misconduct would be comparable to the 30-day actual suspension Drociak received except for the differences in their respective mitigating circumstances. Drociak's misconduct was the product of gross negligence as he used his client's presigned verification because he was unable to reach his client before the discovery responses were due. By contrast, Respondent's misconduct was a purposeful attempt to mislead. Additionally, Respondent had less than four years of practice compared to Drociak's 25-plus years of discipline-free practice prior to his misconduct, meaning that the appropriate level of discipline here should be greater than in Drociak.

Taking into consideration the Standards, recent case law and other factors including that Respondent has made restitution to the victim of his misconduct, he has belatedly cooperated with the State Bar and that the scope of Respondent misconduct is limited to a single client matter, a two-year stayed suspension and a two-year probation with standard conditions including a 60-day actual suspension is an appropriate level of discipline for Respondent's misconduct described herein.

### PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was February 19, 2013.

### COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of February 20, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$3,349.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

### **EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT**

Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may <u>not</u> receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School, ordered as a condition of suspension here. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

(Do not write above this line.)					
In the Matter of: Donald Arthur Hilland	Case number(s): 12-O-12384-RAP				

# SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of the Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

2-24-13		Donald Arthur Hilland
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
2/28/13 Date	telle L. Margelio	Arthur Lewis Margolis
Date /	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name
2/28/2013 Date	Alle	Anand Kumar
Date /	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on March 28, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP 2000 RIVERSIDE DR LOS ANGELES, CA 90039

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

ANAND KUMAR, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on March 28, 2013.

Bernadette C.O. Molina Case Administrator State Bar Court